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From Ambiguity Aversion to a Generalized Expected Utility. Modeling
Preferences in a Quantum Probabilistic Framework
Diederik Aerts∗ and Sandro Sozzo†
Abstract
Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion have been widely studied in decision theory and economics both at a
theoretical and an experimental level. After Ellsberg’s seminal studies challenging subjective expected
utility theory (SEUT), several (mainly normative) approaches have been put forward to reproduce
ambiguity aversion and Ellsberg-type preferences. However, Machina and other authors have pointed out
some fundamental difficulties of these generalizations of SEUT to cope with some variants of Ellsberg’s
thought experiments, which has recently been experimentally confirmed. Starting from our quantum
modeling approach to human cognition, we develop here a general probabilistic framework to model
human decisions under uncertainty. We show that our quantum theoretical model faithfully represents
different sets of data collected on both the Ellsberg and the Machina paradox situations, and is flexible
enough to describe different subjective attitudes with respect to ambiguity. Our approach opens the way
toward a quantum-based generalization of expected utility theory (QEUT), where subjective probabilities
depend on the state of the conceptual entity at play and its interaction with the decision-maker, while
preferences between acts are determined by the maximization of this ‘state-dependent expected utility’.
Keywords: Expected utility theory; Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes; quantum probability; quantum
modeling.
1 Introduction
The deviations from traditional probabilistic models of human cognition that have been experimentally
detected up to now can be roughly divided into two groups, ‘probability judgment errors’ (e.g., ‘conjunction
and disjunction fallacy’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Morier & Borgida, 1984), ‘concept categorization’
(Hampton, 1988a,b), ‘unpacking effects’ (Fox & Tversky, 1998) and ‘decision-making errors’ (e.g., ‘dis-
junction effect’ (Tversky & Shafir, 1992), ‘Allais, Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes’ (Allais, 1953; Ellsbeg,
1961; Machina, 2009)). These traditional models of cognition rest on a classical vision of probability
theory, which can be traced back to the axiomatization proposed by Kolmogorov in the thirties (Kol-
mogorov, 1933). When applied to decision theory and economics, this traditional approach to probability
has produced a unified normative axiomatic theory to model human decisions under uncertainty, which
has been predictively successful for years since the forties, ‘ expected utility theory’ (EUT) (von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). By following Knight’s original distinction of the different forms of
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), one nowadays distinguishes between ‘risk’, that is, ‘uncertainty about known
probabilities’, and ‘ambiguity’, that is, ‘uncertainty about unknown probabilities’. And also EUT takes a
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different mathematical formulation, depending on whether situations in which risk is present, ‘objective
expected utility theory’ (OEUT) (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), or situations in which ambiguity is
present, ‘subjective expected utility theory’ (SEUT) (Savage, 1954). It should however be noticed that the
latter situations have manifold implications in real-life decisions, from financial asset pricing to marketing
choices, portfolio management, medical treatment decisions, as subjective probabilities frequently appear
in everyday decisions, in the form of ‘beliefs about likelihood of events’.
The first experimental challenge to OEUT was identified by Alain Allais in the fifties (Allais, 1953).
Coming to SEUT, its drawbacks arose instead with the so-called ‘Ellsberg urns’ (Ellsberg, 1961). Daniel
Ellsberg presented in 1961 a series of thought experiments with urns and balls of different colors, e.g.,
‘two-color example’ and ‘three-color example’, where he predicted that real human decisions would have
refuted the predictions of SEUT. Ellsberg suggested that people prefer to take actions associated with
events over known rather unknown probabilities or, in other words, ‘people prefer known versus unknown
probabilities’. This conservative attitude was called ‘ambiguity aversion’ by Ellsberg, and it violates a
specific axiom of SEUT, the ‘Sure-Thing principle’ – a violation of this principle is also observed in other
decision-making errors, such as the disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Ambiguity aversion has
been systematically confirmed by several cognitive experiments collected in the last forty years (see, e.g.,
(McCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Camerer & Weber, 1992; Fox & Tversky, 1995);
see also the exhaustive review by Machina and Siniscalchi (2014)), but the one by Slovic and Tversky
(1974), who found an ‘ambiguity seeking’ attitude. Both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity attraction
are however incompatible with the predictions of SEUT, which led many scholars to look for theoretical
alternatives that could accomodate the behavior observed in Ellsberg experiments. These alternatives
have generally a normative status, that is, they describe what people should not, not what people actually
do, and have different names and scopes, for example, ‘expected utility with multiple priors’ (Gilboa
& Schmeidler, 1989), ‘Choquet expected utility theory’ (CEUT) (Schmeidler, 1989), ‘smooth ambiguity
preferences model’ (Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerij, 2005), ‘variational preference model’ (Maccheroni,
Marinacci & Rustichini, 2006), and ‘cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), within
Tversky-Kahneman theory of human heuristics and bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
These generalizations of SEUT were seriously challenged by two thought experiments recently pre-
sented by Mark Machina (2009), the ‘50:51 example’ and the ‘reflection example’ (Machina 2009; Baillon,
L’Haridon & Placido, 2011). In particular, Machina introduced a new element, ‘informational symmetry’,
which violates an axiom of CEUT, called ‘tail separability’, exactly as ambiguity aversion violates the
Sure-Thing principle. Without entering into the technical details of the violation (some aspects of it will
be presented in Section 2), we want to emphasize an implicit assumption of SEUT that is weakened in the
above generalizations. SEUT assumes that a ‘single Kolmogorovian probability distribution over a single
σ-algebra of events is defined which models subjective probabilities’ in human decisions. Departure from
this assumption will become crucial in our approach, as we will see in Section 3.
We have worked in the last years on the identification of quantum structures in cognition and the
mathematical modeling of decision-making under uncertainty, obtaining significant results in the explana-
tion of the so-called human probability judgment errors in terms of genuine quantum aspects (emergence,
entanglement, indistinguishability, interference, superposition) (Aerts & Gabora, 2005a,b; Aerts, 2009a;
Aerts, Broekaert, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts, Gabora & Sozzo, 2013; Aerts, Sozzo & Veloz, 2015a,b;
see also Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013; Wang, Sol-
loway, Shiffrin & Busemeyer, 2014). For what explicitly concerns ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, we
have worked out a quantum theoretical framework to model both the Ellsberg and the Machina paradox
situations (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2012, 2014). Our approach rests on two fundamental observations, as
follows.
(i) In an Ellsberg/Machina-type decision-making process, the agent’s choice is actualized as a conse-
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quence of an interaction with the cognitive context, exactly as in a quantum measurement process the
measurement outcome is actualized as a consequence of the interaction of the measured particle with the
measuring apparatus. Therefore, in cognitive entities, as well as in microscopic quantum entities, mea-
surements do not reveal preexisting values of the observed properties but, rather, they actualize genuine
potentialities. Kolmogorovian probability can only formalize lack of knowledge about actualities, hence it
is generally not able to cope with such a decision-making process. We have proven that this is possible in
Ellsberg/Machina-type decisions by using a complex Hilbert space and representing probability measures
by means of ‘projection valued measures’ on this complex Hilbert space. A projection valued measure is
essentially different from a single Kolmogorovian probability measure, since the latter is a σ-algebra valued
measure, whilst the former is not, due to lack of distributivity (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2012).
(ii) The above notion of ambiguity is completely compatible, both at a mathematical and an intuitive
level, with the representation of states of cognitive entities as vectors of a Hilbert space. Indeed, just
like in quantum theory the state vector incorporates the ‘quantum uncertainty’ of a microscopic particle,
also in an Ellsberg/Machina-type situation, the agent’s subjective preference toward ambiguity is naturally
formalized by representing the conceptual situation the agent is confronted with by means of such a Hilbert
space vector. In our approach, ambiguity aversion is only one of the conceptual landscapes surrounding
the decision-maker’s choice in a situation where ambiguity is present (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2014). This
representation is compatible with the experimental findings confirming Ellsberg’s prediction about the
human attitude toward ambiguity, but also with some recent experiments where such attitude is more
controversial (see, e.g., (Slovic & Tversky, 1974; Binmore, Stewart & Voorhoeve, 2012); see also the review
(Machina & Siniscalchi, 2014)).
We develop in Section 3 an amended and updated theoretical framework, where subjective probabilities
and preferences in the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations are modeled by using the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory, which is briefly summarized in A. Further, we show in the same section
that our quantum theoretical model successfully represents both an experiment on the Ellsberg three-
color example by ourselves, confirming Ellsberg-type preferences (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2012), and an
experiment on the Machina reflection example by l’Haridon and Placido (2010), confirming Machina-type
preferences.
Our quantum theoretical framework opens the way to a ‘contextual quantum-based generalization of
EUT’ (QEUT), where human preferences also depend on the conceptual, not only the physical, state
encoding the potential effects of the cognitive context. These effects include, in particular, subjective
preferences toward ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. Because of Gleason theorem (Gleason, 1957), this
conceptual state is bijectively associated with a standard quantum probability distribution modeling the
subjective probabilities of the decision-maker in that conceptual state. Whenever the conceptual state
changes as a consequence of, e.g., a decision, also the quantum probability distribution modeling the
subjective probability changes, which enables representation of Ellsberg-type and Machina-type situations.
Therefore, each act is associated with a ‘state-dependent expected utility’ in QEUT, and human preferences
are determined by the maximization of this state-dependent expected utility. This change of perspective is
important, in our opinion, because it enables modeling of different types of human behavior, from ambiguity
aversion to ambiguity attraction, Sure-Thing principle, principle of insufficient reason, as we conclude in
Section 4.
2 Expected utility, Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes
In this section we summarize the essential definitions and results of SEUT that we need to discuss Ellsberg
and Machina paradoxes (Savage, 1954). Our basic mathematical framework requires a set S of physical
states, a σ-algebra A ⊆ P(S ) of subsets of S which we call ‘events’, and a subjective probability measure
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Act Red Yellow Black
f1 $100 $0 $0
f2 $0 $0 $100
f3 $100 $100 $0
f4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1. The payoff matrix for the Ellsberg three-color thought experiment.
p : A ⊆ P(S ) −→ [0, 1] over A . Then, we denote by X the set of all consequences. An ‘act’ is defined
as a function f : S −→ X . Next, we introduce a weak preference relation % over acts, where ≻ and ∼
denote strong preference and indifference, respectively. Finally, let u : X −→ ℜ denote a ‘Bernoulli utility
function’ over the set of consequences, and suppose that u is strictly increasing and continuous.
For the sake of simplicity, let us introduce the following simplifications. Firstly, let us only consider
discrete and finite cases. Secondly, let us introduce the set {E1, E2, . . . , En} of events, and suppose that
E1, E2, . . . , En are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e. form a partition of S . Thirdly, assume that,
for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the event Ei occurs with probability pi, which might be unknown. Let f be
the act that, for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n, associates the event Ei with the consequence xi, and suppose
that xi ∈ ℜ, so that xi denotes a monetary payoff. Then, the act f can be represented as the 2n-ple
f = (E1, x1;E2, x2; . . . ;En, xn). As usual, we define the expected utility of the act f by means of the
functional W (f) =W (E1, x1;E2, x2; . . . ;En, xn) =
∑n
i=1 piu(xi).
Let now f and g be two acts, and let W (f) and W (g) be the corresponding expected utilities. Then,
Savage proved that, if some axioms are satisfied, including the Sure-Thing principle, we have f % g if
and only if W (f) ≥ W (g) (Savage, 1954). We stress that a single subjective probability distribution p is
assumed which is defined over a single σ-algebra A of events.
However, in 1961 Ellsberg firstly predicted in his ‘two-color example’ that people do not always choose
by maximizing their subjective expected utility, but they generally prefer acts over events with known (or
objective) probabilities to acts over events with unknown (or subjective) probabilities, a phenomenon called
‘ambiguity aversion’. The thought experiment where ambiguity aversion manifestly clashes with SEUT is
the ‘three-color example’.
Consider one urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either yellow or black in unknown proportion.
One ball will be drawn at random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of
the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 defined in Table 1. Ellsberg suggested that, when asked to rank these acts, most
of the persons will prefer f1 over f2 and f4 over f3. On the other hand, acts f1 and f4 are ‘unambiguous’,
as they are associated with events over known probabilities, while acts f2 and f3 are ‘ambiguous’, as they
are associated with events over unknown probabilities. Conclusion follows at once. People prefer the
unambiguous act over its ambiguous counterpart. There is a huge experimental evidence that decision-
makers actually show this ambiguity aversion (see, e.g., the extensive review by Machina and Siniscalchi
(2014)). Only the experiment by Slovic and Tversky (1974) indicated that ‘ambiguity attraction’ was at
play, while more recent experiments identify other behavioral mechanisms as primary (Binmore, Stewart
& Voorhoeve, 2012).
Neither ambiguity aversion nor ambiguity attraction can be explained within SEUT, as they violate
the Sure-Thing principle, according to which, preferences should be independent of the common outcome.
In the specific case of the three-color urn, preferences should not depend on whether the common event “a
yellow ball is drawn” pays off $0 or $100. More technically, SEUT predicts ‘consistency of decision-makers’
preferences’, that is, f1 is preferred to f2 if and only if f3 is preferred to f4. A simple calculation shows
that this is impossible. Indeed, if we denote by pR, pY and pB the subjective probability that a red ball, a
yellow ball, a black ball, respectively, is drawn (with pR = 1/3 = 1− (pY +pB)), then the expected utilities
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Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $0 $50 $25 $25
f2 $0 $25 $50 $25
f3 $25 $50 $25 $0
f4 $25 $25 $50 $0
Table 2. The payoff matrix for the Machina reflection example with lower tail shifts.
W (fi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are such that W (f1) > W (f2) if and only if (pR − pB)(u(100) − u(0)) > 0 if and
only if W (f3) > W (f4). Hence, no assignment of the subjective probabilities pR, pY and pB reproduces a
preference with W (f1) > W (f2) and W (f4) > W (f3).
In the last forty years several generalizations of SEUT have been proposed in order to account for am-
biguity and/or ambiguity aversion, introducing expected utility with multiple priors (Gilboa & Schmeidler,
1989), Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989), smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci &
Mukerij, 2005), variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini, 2006), etc. (Machina & Sinis-
calchi, 2014). In particular, CEUT, which ranks events each other, has been quite successful to model Allais
and Ellsberg paradoxes, and in many applications in economics and finance (see, e.g., (Hansen & Sargent,
2000)). However, in 2009 Mark Machina proposed new thought experiments, which seriously challenged
these normative approaches. We have discussed in detail the ‘50:51 example’ in (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia,
2012). Here we analyze the ‘reflection example’ (Machina, 2009; Baillon, l’Haridon & Placido, 2011), which
questions an axiom of CEUT, the so-called ‘tail separability’, exactly as the Ellsberg three-color example
questions the Sure-Thing principle of SEUT.
It is possible to elaborate two versions of the reflection example, as follows (l’Haridon & Placido, 2010).
‘Reflection example with lower tail shifts’. Consider one urn with 20 balls, 10 are either red or yellow
in unknown proportion, 10 are either black or green in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn at
random from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4
defined in Table 2. Machina introduced the notion of ‘informational symmetry’, namely, the events “the
drawn ball is red or yellow” and “the drawn ball is black or green” have known and equal probability and,
further, the ambiguity about the distribution of colors is similar in the two events. In an informational
symmetry perspective, people should prefer act f1 over act f2 and act f4 over act f3, or they should prefer
act f2 over act f1 and act f3 over act f4. On the other hand, let us introduce the utilities u(0), u(25)
and u(50), the subjective probabilities pR, pY , pB and pG, and calculate the expected utilities W (fi) of
the acts fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, according to SEUT, we have again that preferences should be consistent,
namely, W (f1) > W (f2) if and only if (u(50) − u(25))(pY − pB) > 0 if and only if W (f3) > W (f4). The
interesting aspect of this example is that CEUT predicts similar consistency requirements on the basis
of tail separability. A recent experiment by L’Haridon and Placido (2010) confirms instead the Machina
preference f1 % f2 and f4 % f3, consistently with informational symmetry. We will discuss the details of
this experiment in Section 3, where we will represent it within our general quantum theoretical modeling.
But, we can already maintain that such type of preferences needs a completely new theoretical approach
to ambiguity.
‘Reflection example with upper tail shifts’. Consider one urn with 20 balls, 10 are either red or yellow in
unknown proportion, 10 are either black or green in unknown proportion. One ball will be drawn at random
from the urn. Then, free of charge, a person is asked to bet on one of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 defined
in Table 3. According to Machina’s informational symmetry, people should again prefer act f1 over act f2
and act f4 over act f3, or they should prefer act f2 over act f1 and act f3 over act f4. On the other hand,
let us introduce the utilities u(25), u(50) and u(75), the subjective probabilities pR, pY , pB and pG, and
calculate the expected utilities W (fi) of the acts fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, according to SEUT, we have that
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Act Red Yellow Black Green
f1 $50 $50 $25 $75
f2 $50 $25 $50 $75
f3 $75 $50 $25 $50
f4 $75 $25 $50 $50
Table 3. The payoff matrix for the Machina reflection example with upper tail shifts.
preferences should again be consistent, namely, W (f1) > W (f2) if and only if (u(50)−u(25))(pY −pB) > 0
if and only if W (f3) > W (f4). One shows that tail separability of CEUT leads to a similar prediction. The
experiment by L’Haridon and Placido (2010) confirms again the Machina preference f1 % f2 and f4 % f3,
consistently with informational symmetry. Necessity of new approaches to model this type of preferences
follows at once.
3 A quantum theoretical framework to model human preferences
We develop in this section an amended and more rigorous theoretical framework to model Ellsberg and
Machina paradox situations that uses the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, whose essentials
are summarized in A. Our approach rests on the results in (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2012, 2014). The
fundamental assumptions that we make are the following.
(i) The conceptual (Ellsberg, Machina, etc.) situation is described by a well defined state pv. This
state has a conceptual nature, hence it should be distinguished from a physical state (see Section 2). The
conceptual state mathematically captures aspects of ambiguity.
(ii) There is a contextual interaction of a cognitive, not physical, nature between the decision-maker
and the conceptual situation that is the object of the decision. This contextual interaction determines a
change of the state of the conceptual entity.
(iii) The conceptual situation, state and decision-making process are modeled by using the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory. It follows from Gleason theorem (Gleason, 1957) that the conceptual state
identifies a single quantum probability distribution through the Born rule and, for some states, we can
interpret this probability distribution as subjective probability for the decision-making process.
Let us now consider the Ellsberg three-color example and represent it by using the quantum mechanical
formalism. The conceptual Ellsberg entity is the urn with 30 red balls and 60 yellow and black balls in
unknown proportion. Since we have introduced the notion of state to describe the conceptual entity, we
denote by pv a state describing a possible ‘conceptual state of being’ of the Ellsberg entity with 30 red balls
and 60 yellow and black balls in unknown proportion. Note that several ‘conceptual states of being’ of the
Ellsberg entity are possible, if we, for example, also specify something more than just ‘unknown proportion’
about yellow and black balls, and then this different conceptual situation of the Ellsberg entity would be
represented by a different state. Because we use the quantum formalism each state pv is represented by the
unit vector |v〉 of the complex Hilbert space C3 over complex numbers. The choice of C3 is due to the fact
that we have three mutually exclusive and exhaustive events in the three-color example – the generalization
to the Ellsberg n-color example is straightforward. We denote by (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) the unit
vectors of the canonical basis of C3.
Let us consider a ‘color measurement’ e performed on the conceptual Ellsberg entity in a state pv. This
color measurement has three outcomes oR, oY , oB, corresponding to the three colors red, yellow and black,
respectively, and it is represented by the self-adjoint operator E with spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i|}i=R,Y,B ,
where |R〉, |Y 〉 and |B〉 are the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalues oR, oY and oB , respectively,
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of E . Equivalently, we have E =
∑
3
i=1 oiPi. We do not lose in generality by setting |R〉 = (1, 0, 0),
|Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0), and |B〉 = (0, 0, 1). With this choice, a state pv of the conceptual Ellsberg entity is
represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = ρReiθR |R〉+ ρY eiθY |Y 〉+ ρBeiθB |B〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB ) (1)
By using quantum probabilistic rules, the probability µv(oi, e) of drawing a ball of color i, i = R,Y,B,
when the conceptual Ellsberg entity is in a state pv is given by
µv(oi, e) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (2)
We have ρ2R = 1/3, as the urn contains 30 red balls. Therefore, a state pv of the conceptual Ellsberg entity
is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY ,
√
2
3
− ρ2Y eiθB ) (3)
Let us now introduce two specific states of the conceptual Ellsberg entity. The state pRY describes the
conceptual situation where there are no black balls, hence it is represented by the unit vector
|vRY 〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR ,
√
2
3
eiθY , 0) (4)
The state pRB describes instead the conceptual situation where there are no yellow balls, hence it is
represented by the unit vector
|vRB〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , 0,
√
2
3
eiθB ) (5)
The Ellsberg entity is a conceptual entity, which means that ‘cognitive contexts’ have an influence on
its state, and in general will make a specific state change into another state. This is what happens in the
conceptual realm in analogy with the physical realm, where a physical context will in general change the
physical state of a physical entity. Hence, whenever a decision-maker is asked to ponder between the choice
of f1 and f2, the pondering itself, before a choice is made, is a cognitive context, and hence it changes
in general the state of the conceptual Ellsberg entity. Equally so, whenever a decision-maker is asked to
ponder between the choice of f3 and f4, also this introduces a cognitive context, before the choice is made –
and a context which in general is different from the one introduced by pondering about the choice between
f1 and f2 – which will in general change the state of the conceptual Ellsberg entity.
Let us now introduce a state p0 describing the situation where no cognitive context is present, and
call it the ‘ground state’ of the Ellsberg entity. We can identify this ground state by introducing a new
measurement, which would consist of asking a subject to ‘estimate the number of balls’, red, yellow and
black, without mentioning any reference to a bet that has to be taken. The red balls will be estimated to
be 30 in number, because that is a given amount. For the black and yellow balls subject might estimate
differently, but if no conceptual context at all is present, and hence only the presentation of the Ellsberg
entity itself is offered to the subjects, on average estimations will be 30 black balls and 30 yellow balls, as
a consequence of the symmetry present in the Ellsberg entity – unknown number of black and yellow their
sum being equal to 60 induces the symmetry 30 black and 30 yellow. More specifically, the unit vector
|v0〉 = 1√
3
(1, 1, 1) in the canonical basis of C3 represents well this symmetry, and hence we will use it to
describe the ground state p0 of the Ellsberg entity. Then, a pondering about the choice between f1 and
f2 will make the state p0 of the conceptual Ellsberg entity change to a state pw1 that is generally different
from the state pw2 in which the Ellsberg conceptual entity changes from p0 when pondering about a choice
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between f3 and f4. In particular, a ‘highly ambiguity averse’ decision-maker will be, as a consequence of
his or her pondering in the choice between acts f1 and f2, confronted with the conceptual Ellsberg entity
which changes from the ground state p0 to a state pw1 that is very close to the state pRY represented in (4).
Analogously, a ‘highly ambiguity averse’ decision-maker will be, as a consequence of his or her pondering
in the choice between acts f3 and f4, confronted with the conceptual Ellsberg entity which changes from
the state p0 to a state pw that is very close to the state pRB represented in (5).
Let us now come to the representation of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 1, Section 2. For a given
utility function u, to be determined experimentally, we respectively associate f1, f2, f3 and f4 with the
self-adjoint ‘utility operators’
F1 = u(100)PR + u(0)PY + u(0)PB (6)
F2 = u(0)PR + u(0)PY + u(100)PB (7)
F3 = u(100)PR + u(100)PY + u(0)PB (8)
F4 = u(0)PR + u(100)PY + u(100)PB (9)
The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv of the conceptual Ellsberg entity are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|F1|v〉 = 1
3
u(100) +
2
3
u(0) (10)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|F2|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(0) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(100) (11)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|F2|v〉 = (1
3
+ ρ2Y )u(100) + (
2
3
− ρ2Y )u(0) (12)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|F4|v〉 = 1
3
u(0) +
2
3
u(100) (13)
As we can see, Wv(f1) and Wv(f4) do not depend on the state pv, and this would be the case for an
arbitrary state p, hence they are ambiguity-free, i.e. independent of the state, while Wv(f2) and Wv(f3)
do depend on pv, and will depend on any state. This means that it is possible to find a state pw1 such that
Ww1(f1) > Ww2(f2), e.g., the state represented in (4), and a state pw2 such that Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3), e.g.,
the state represented in (5). These two states perfectly reproduce Ellsberg preferences, in agreement with
an ambiguity aversion assumption.
Let us now study how the quantum theoretical model above works in practice. We performed a cognitive
experiment in which we asked 57 persons, chosen among our colleagues and friends, to rank the four acts
in Table 1, Section 2. The details of the experiment are presented in (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2014). In it,
34 participants preferred acts f1 and f4, 12 participants preferred acts f2 and f3, 7 participants preferred
acts f2 and f4, and 6 participants preferred acts f1 and f3. This makes the weights with preference of acts
f1 over act f2 to be 0.68 against 0.32, and the weights with preference of act f4 over act f3 to be 0.69
against 0.31. Hence, 34+12=46 persons over 57 chose f1 and f4 or the inversion f2 and f3, for an ‘inversion
percentage’ of 78%, thus confirming the typical behavior observed in the Ellsberg three-color example.
A quantum mechanical model for our experimental data can be constructed as follows. We look for
two orthogonal states pw1 and pw2 , represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉, respectively, such that
〈w1|F1 −F2|w1〉 = 0.68 (14)
〈w2|F4 −F3|w2〉 = 0.69 (15)
where Fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, have been defined in (6)–(9). In the color basis {|R〉, |Y 〉, |B〉}, which coincides
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with the canonical basis of C3, |w1〉 and |w2〉 can be written as
|w1〉 = ( 1√
3
eiθR , ρY e
iθY , ρBe
iθB ) (16)
|w2〉 = ( 1√
3
eiφR , τY e
iφY , τBe
iφB ) (17)
The normalization conditions 〈w1|w1〉 = 〈w2|w2〉 = 1 entail
ρ2Y + ρ
2
B =
2
3
= τ2Y + τ
2
B (18)
while the orthogonality condition 〈w1|w2〉 = 0 entails
1
3
cos(φR − θR) + ρY τY cos(φY − θY ) + ρBτB cos(φB − θB) = 0 (19)
1
3
sin(φR − θR) + ρY τY sin(φY − θY ) + ρBτB sin(φB − θB) = 0 (20)
From (6), (7) and (14) we get
ρB =
√
1
3
− 0.68
u(100) − u(0) (21)
whence, by using (18)
ρY =
√
1
3
+
0.68
u(100) − u(0) (22)
Analogously, from (8), (9) and (15) we get
τB =
√
1
3
+
0.69
u(100) − u(0) (23)
whence, by using (18)
τY =
√
1
3
− 0.69
u(100) − u(0) (24)
The symmetry of the equations now suggests to set θR = φR = 0 and φY − θY = φB− θB. This means that
we have to solve a system of 11 equations in 11 unknown variables θR, θY , θB, φR, φY , φB , ρY , ρB ,τY , τB,
and u(100) − u(0).
One can verify that a solution exists for
θR = 0 θY = 28
◦ θB = 9.3◦ (25)
φR = 0 φY = 208
◦ φB = 189.3◦ (26)
ρY = 0.787 ρB = 0.216 (27)
τY = 0.206 τB = 0.790 (28)
u(100) − u(0) = 2.373 (29)
Hence, the states pw1 and pw2 reproducing the data collected in the Ellsberg three-color example are
represented by the unit vectors
|w1〉 = ( 1√
3
, 0.787ei28
◦
, 0.216ei9.3
◦
) (30)
|w2〉 = ( 1√
3
, 0.206ei208
◦
, 0.790ei189.3
◦
) (31)
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These states describe the conceptual Ellsberg entity with on average 55.8 yellow balls and 4.2 black balls,
when the cognitive context induced by pondering about the bet between acts f1 and f2 is present, and 3.8
yellow balls and 56.2 black balls, when the cognitive context induced by pondering about the bet between
acts f3 and f4 is present, for an utility u(100) − u(0) ≈ 2.4.
This completes the construction of a quantum mechanical model for the data collected on the Ellsberg
three-color example. We will see, however, that this case study can be naturally extended to more complex
situations.
Let us now come to the ‘Machina reflection example’ and represent it by using the quantum mechanical
formalism. We start from the reflection example with lower tail shifts. The conceptual Machina entity is
the urn with 10 red or yellow balls and 10 black or green balls, in both cases in unknown proportion. A
possible state pv of the Machina entity is represented by the unit vector |v〉 of the complex Hilbert space
C
4 over complex numbers. We denote by (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1) the unit vectors of
the canonical basis of C4.
Then, we consider a ‘color measurement’ e performed in a state pv. The measurement has four outcomes
oR, oY , oB and oG corresponding to the four colors red, yellow, black and green, respectively, and it is
represented by the self-adjoint operator E with spectral family {Pi = |i〉〈i|}i=R,Y,B,G, where |R〉, |Y 〉,
|B〉 and |G〉 are the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalues oR, oY , oB and oG, respectively, of E .
Equivalently, we have E =
∑
4
i=1 oiPi. We set |R〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0), |Y 〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0), |B〉 = (0, 0, 1, 0) and
|G〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1), as in the Ellsberg case. Hence, a state pv is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = ρReiθR |R〉+ ρY eiθY |Y 〉+ ρBeiθB |B〉+ ρGeiθG |G〉 = (ρReiθR , ρY eiθY , ρBeiθB , ρGeiθG) (32)
By using quantum probabilistic rules, the probability µv(oi, e) of drawing a ball of color i, i = R,Y,B,G,
when the Machina entity is in a state pv is given by
µv(oi, e) = 〈v|Pi|v〉 = |〈i|v〉|2 = ρ2i (33)
The reflection with lower tail shifts situation requires that ρ2R + ρ
2
Y = 1/2 = ρ
2
B + ρ
2
G. Therefore, a state
pv of the Machina entity is represented by the unit vector
|v〉 = (ρReiθR ,
√
1
2
− ρ2ReiθY , ρBeiθB ,
√
1
2
− ρ2BeiθG) (34)
As in the Ellsberg case, let us suppose that the ground state p0 of the conceptual Machina entity completely
reflects the symmetry between the different colors. Thus, p0 is represented by the unit vector |v0〉 =
1
2
(1, 1, 1, 1). Whenever the decision-maker is presented with the Machina paradox situation, his or her
pondering about the choices to make gives rise to a cognitive context, which changes the state of the
conceptual Machina entity from p0 to a generally different state pw, represented by the unit vector |w〉, as
in (34). In this framework, the pondering about a choice between f1 and f2 will make the ground state
p0 of the conceptual Machina entity change to a state pw1 that is generally different from the state pw2 in
which the Machina conceptual entity changes from the ground state p0 in a pondering about the choice
between f3 and f4.
Let us now come to the representation of the acts f1, f2, f3 and f4 in Table 2, Section 2. For a given
utility function u, to be determined experimentally, we respectively associate f1, f2, f3 and f4 with the
self-adjoint ‘utility operators’
F1 = u(0)PR + u(50)PY + u(25)PB + u(25)PG (35)
F2 = u(0)PR + u(25)PY + u(50)PB + u(25)PG (36)
F3 = u(25)PR + u(50)PY + u(25)PB + u(0)PG (37)
F4 = u(25)PR + u(25)PY + u(50)PB + u((0)PG (38)
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The corresponding expected utilities in a state pv are
Wv(f1) = 〈v|F1|v〉 = u(0)ρ2R + u(50)ρ2Y +
1
2
u(25) (39)
Wv(f2) = 〈v|F2|v〉 = u(0)ρ2R + u(25)ρ2Y + u(50)ρ2B + u(25)ρ2G (40)
Wv(f3) = 〈v|F2|v〉 = u(25)ρ2R + u(50)ρ2Y + u(25)ρ2B + u(0)ρ2G (41)
Wv(f4) = 〈v|F4|v〉 = 1
2
u(25) + u(50)ρ2B + u(0)ρ
2
G (42)
All expected utilities depend on the state pv, thus it is possible to find a state pw1 such that Ww1(f1) >
Ww1(f2) (Ww1(f2) > Ww1(f1)), and a state pw2 such that Ww2(f4) > Ww2(f3) (Ww2(f3) > Ww2(f4)).
Indeed, let us consider the state pY G describing the conceptual situation where there are no red balls and
no black balls. This state is represented by the unit vector
|vY G〉 = (0,
√
1
2
eiθY , 0,
√
1
2
eiθG) (43)
Then, let us consider the state pRB describing the conceptual situation where there are no yellow balls and
no green balls. This state is represented by the unit vector
|vRB〉 = (
√
1
2
eiθR , 0,
√
1
2
eiθB , 0) (44)
By using (39), (40), (41) and (42), we have WY G(f1) =WRB(f4) and WY G(f2) =WRB(f3). Therefore, the
states pY G and pRB perfectly reproduce informational symmetry in the Machina reflection example with
lower tail shifts.
Let us now apply this quantum mechanical model for the Machina paradox situation to model the
data collected in (L’Haridon & Placido, 2010) on the reflection example with lower tail shifts. These
authors asked 94 students to rank the four acts in Table 2, Section 2. The students’ response was that
11 students preferred acts f1 and f3, 44 students preferred acts f1 and f4, 15 students preferred acts f2
and f4, and 24 students preferred acts f2 and f3. This entails that 44 + 24 = 68 students over 94 reversed
their preferences, for a ratio of 0.72, thus violating SEUT and in agreement with Machina’s expectations
(L’Haridon & Placido, 2010). Equivalently, a rate of 0.59 preferred act f1 over act f2, and a rate of 0.63
preferred act f4 over f3.
A quantum mechanical model for the experimental data above can be constructed as follows. We look
for two orthogonal states pw1 and pw2 , represented by the unit vectors |w1〉 and |w2〉, respectively, such
that
〈w1|F1 −F2|w1〉 = 0.59 (45)
〈w2|F4 −F3|w2〉 = 0.63 (46)
where Fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, have been defined in (35)–(38). In the color basis {|R〉, |Y 〉, |B〉, |G〉}, which
coincides with the canonical basis of C4, |w1〉 and |w2〉 can be written as
|w1〉 = (ρReiθR ,
√
1
2
− ρ2ReiθY , ρBeiθB ,
√
1
2
− ρ2BeiθG) (47)
|w2〉 = (τReiφR ,
√
1
2
− τ2ReiφY , τBeiφB ,
√
1
2
− τ2BeiφG) (48)
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The normalization conditions 〈w1|w1〉 = 〈w2|w2〉 = 1 does not provide further information on the unknown
variables, while the orthogonality condition 〈w1|w2〉 = 0 entails
ρRτR cos(φR − θR) + ρY τY cos(φY − θY ) + ρBτB cos(φB − θB) + ρGτG cos(φG − θG) = 0 (49)
ρRτR sin(φR − θR) + ρY τY sin(φY − θY ) + ρBτB sin(φB − θB) + ρGτG sin(φG − θG) = 0 (50)
Equation ρ2R + ρ
2
Y = 1/2 entails
ρR =
√
1
2
− ρ2Y (51)
Further we get, from (35), (36) and (45),
ρB =
√
ρ2Y −
0.59
u(50) − u(25) (52)
whence
ρG =
√
1
2
− ρ2Y +
0.59
u(50)− u(25) (53)
by using ρ2B + ρ
2
G = 1/2. Analogously, from (37), (38) and (46) we get
τB =
√
τ2Y +
0.63
u(50) − u(25) (54)
whence
τG =
√
1
2
− τ2Y −
0.63
u(50) − u(25) (55)
by using τ2B + τ
2
G = 1/2. Finally, one has
τR =
√
1
2
− τ2Y (56)
One can verify that a solution exists for
θR = 87.1
◦ θY = 1.6◦ θB = 1.0◦ θG = 185.2◦ (57)
φR = 0.7
◦ φY = 191.8◦ φB = 2.9◦ φG = 7.4◦ (58)
ρR = 0 ρY = 0.71 ρB = 0.38 ρG = 0.60 (59)
τR = 0.71 τY = 0.05 τB = 0.62 τG = 0.34 (60)
u(50)− u(25) = 1.636 (61)
Hence, the states pw1 and pw2 reproducing the data collected in the Machina reflection example with lower
tail shifts are represented by the unit vectors
|w1〉 = (0, 0.71ei1.6◦ , 0.38ei1◦ , 0.60ei185.2◦ ) (62)
|w2〉 = (0.71ei0.7◦ , 0.05ei191.8◦ , 0.62ei2.9◦ , 0.34ei7.4◦) (63)
This completes the construction of a quantum mechanical model for the Machina reflection example with
lower tail shifts.
L’Haridon and Placido (2010) also tested the reflection example with upper tail shifts. The authors
asked the same 94 students to rank the four acts in Table 3, Section 2. The students’ response was that
12
8 students preferred acts f1 and f3, 47 students preferred acts f1 and f4, 6 students preferred acts f2 and
f4, and 33 students preferred acts f2 and f3. This entails that 47 + 33 = 80 students over 94 reversed
their preferences, for a ratio of 0.85, thus violating SEUT and in agreement with Machina’s expectations.
Equivalently, a rate of 0.59 preferred act f1 over act f2, and a rate of 0.56 preferred act f4 over f3.
A quantum mechanical model for these experimental data can be constructed by following the general
lines above. One can verify that the following set of parameters constitutes a solution.
θR = 0.3
◦ θY = 11.6◦ θB = 1.3◦ θG = 196.5◦ (64)
φR = 0.7
◦ θY = 193.5◦ θB = 1.7◦ θG = 16.9◦ (65)
ρR = 0.02 ρY = 0.71 ρB = 0.38 ρG = 0.60 (66)
τR = 0.71 τY = 0 τB = 0.59 τG = 0.39 (67)
u(50) − u(25) = 1.636 (68)
The states pw1 and pw2 reproducing the data collected in the Machina reflection example with upper tail
shifts are represented by the unit vectors
|w1〉 = (0.02ei0.3◦ , 0.71ei11.6◦ , 0.38ei1.3◦ , 0.60ei196.5◦ ) (69)
|w2〉 = (0.71ei0.7◦ , 0, 0.59ei1.7◦ , 0.39ei16.9◦ ) (70)
Hence, also the reflection example with upper tail shifts can be modeled within our quantum theoretical
framework.
4 Toward a quantum probabilistic expected utility theory
The analysis of the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations in Section 3 allows us to point out two
fundamental aspects of our quantum theoretical approach to model human decisions under uncertainty, as
follows.
(i) Our model mathematically captures ambiguity in its generality, and it is flexible enough to reproduce
realistic situations where ambiguity aversion prevails, but also situations where different subjective attitudes
toward ambiguity, such as ambiguity attraction, or even other behaviors, prevail. Further, a quantum
mechanical approach of this type is also compatible with experimental situations where human preferences
accord with the predictions of SEUT and the Sure-Thing principle holds. This provides a theoretical
support to a conjecture we made in some previous papers (Aerts, Sozzo & Tapia, 2012; 2014), where we
hypothesized that ambiguity aversion is only one – albeit a very important one – of the cognitive aspects
driving human decisions in uncertainty situations, and that, more generally, it is the overall cognitive
landscape which influences the human judgment in these situations.
(ii) The mathematical element that captures ambiguity is the state describing the conceptual entity that
is the object of the decision. It is this conceptual state that incorporates the subjective preferences toward
ambiguity in a very specific way, namely the ambiguity preference – aversion, attraction or neutrality –
introduces a cognitive context at the moment when the pondering about a choice takes place, and this
cognitive context changes the state of the conceptual entity under consideration – the Ellsberg entity
or the Machina entity. If we now extend our quantum theoretical modeling to any conceptual entity,
then we can represent this conceptual state by means of a unit vector of a Hilbert space H . By using
Gleason theorem, we can bijectively associate this unit vector with a quantum probability distribution,
the latter serving as the subjective probability distribution modeling human decisions. Therefore, one
can point out a fundamental difference between SEUT and our quantum theoretical approach. Indeed,
subjective probability is modeled in a single classical (Kolmogorovian) probability space over a single σ–
algebra of events, according to SEUT. On the contrary, subjective probability is modeled in a quantum
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probability framework over a (non-Boolean) lattice of projection operators representing events, according to
our quantum approach. In addition, subjective probabilities are fixed in SEUT and are the same also when
situations of pondering about choices between different acts are considered. On the contrary, subjective
probabilities are ‘state-dependent’ in our approach, hence the quantum probability distribution changes
together with the state of the conceptual entity when situations of pondering about different choices are
considered.
Points (i) and (ii) suggest us to sketch a state-dependent generalization of SEUT based on the math-
ematical formalism of quantum theory and modeling human preferences. Let us call ‘quantum expected
utility theory’ (QEUT) this generalization. For the sake of simplicity, we use the same symbols, notations
and simplifications that we have introduced in Section 2 for SEUT.
Let us consider a conceptual entity S described by a Hilbert space H , and denote by L (H ) the
complete orthocomplemented lattice of all projection operators over H (see A).1 In each instant the
conceptual entity S is in a state pv, represented by the unit vector |v〉 belonging to H . Because of Gleason
theorem, |v〉 is bijectively associated with a quantum probability distribution pv : L (H ) −→ [0, 1], such
that, for every P ∈ L (H ), pv(P ) = 〈v|P |v〉. The elements of L (H ) represent events, in this formulation.
Let us now consider a set {E1, E2, . . . , En} of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, represented by the
spectral family {Pi}i=1,2,...,n of orthogonal projection operators P1, P2, . . . , Pn, so that
∑n
i=1 Pi = 1, where
1 is the identity operator over H . If the event Ei is associated with the consequence xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
then the act f = (E1, x1;E2, x2; . . . ;En, xn) is represented by an ‘utility self-adjoint operator’
F =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)Pi (71)
where u is a Bernoulli utility function over the set X of consequences. Then, the act f = (E1, x1;E2, x2; . . . , En, xn)
is described by an ‘expected utility in the state pv’ given by
Wv(f) = 〈v|F |v〉 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)〈v|Pi|v〉 =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)pv(Pi) (72)
In our representation, the quantum probability measure pv(·) models the subjective probability associated
with a human decision on the act f . It is important to mention that, if the conceptual entity S is in a
different state pw, represented by the unit vector |w〉 ∈ H , then the decision on the act f is modeled by a
different quantum probability measure pw(·).
Let us now consider two acts the act f = (F1, x1;F2, x2; . . . ;Fn, xn) and the act g = (G1, y1;G2, y2; . . . ;Gn, yn),
where the event Fi is associated with the consequence xi, and the event Gi is associated with the conse-
quence yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, we introduce a ‘(state-dependent) preference relation’ %v in the state pv,
as follows.
Definition 1. We say that ‘act f is ‘preferred to act g in the state pv’ of a conceptual entity S, and write
f %v g if we have Wv(f) ≥ Wv(g), where Wv(f) and Wv(g) are the expected utilities of acts f and g,
respectively, in the state pv.
Suppose now that the mutually exclusive and exhaustive events G1, G2, . . . , Gn are represented by the
spectral family {Qi}i=1,2,...,n of orthogonal projection operators Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn, so that
∑n
i=1Qi = 1.
Then, the weak preference relation f %v g in Definition 1 is equivalent to the requirement
n∑
i=1
〈v|u(xi)Pi − u(yi)Qi|v〉 ≥ 0 (73)
1It is well known that L (H ) is, in particular, weakly modular, but it is not distributive, hence it is non-Boolean.
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where F =
∑
i u(xi)Pi and G =
∑
i u(yi)Qi are the utility self-adjoint operators representing acts f and
g, respectively. Equation (73) generalizes the preference relations that we have found in the specific cases
of the Ellsberg and Machina paradox situations in Section 3. One can then determine from experimental
data the utilities u(xi), u(yi) and the unit vector |v〉 modeling concrete human preferences, as we have
done in Section 3.
The previous mathematical construction allows an extension of traditional SEUT that automatically
incorporates ambiguity, ambiguity aversion and other relevant attitudes toward uncertainty. It is still at a
descriptive level and, indeed, a normative formulation of QEUT would require the introduction of plausible
axioms bijectively connecting preference relations with state-dependent expected utilities. Moreover, it
is worth investigating how traditional state-independent SEUT can be recovered from state-dependent
QEUT. In particular, the mutual relationships between the weak preference relation % in SEUT and the
weak preference relation %v in QEUT should be deepened. We plan to devote our future research to answer
these questions, because any human decision, be it economic, financial, political or medical, crucially relies
on a satisfactory model of decision-making in presence of uncertainty.
A Fundamentals of a quantum-theoretic modeling
We illustrate in this section how the mathematical formalism of quantum theory can be applied to model
situations outside the microscopic quantum world, more specifically, in the representation of conceptual
entities, like the Ellsberg or the Machina entity. We avoid in our presentation superfluous technicalities,
but aim to be synthetic and rigorous at the same time.
When the quantum mechanical formalism is applied for modeling purposes, each considered entity – in
our case a conceptual entity – is associated with a complex Hilbert space H, that is, a vector space over
the field C of complex numbers, equipped with an inner product 〈·|·〉 that maps two vectors 〈A| and |B〉
onto a complex number 〈A|B〉. We denote vectors by using the bra-ket notation introduced by Paul Adrien
Dirac, one of the pioneers of quantum theory (Dirac, 1958). Vectors can be ‘kets’, denoted by |A〉, |B〉, or
‘bras’, denoted by 〈A|, 〈B|. The inner product between the ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉, or the bra-vectors 〈A|
and 〈B|, is realized by juxtaposing the bra vector 〈A| and the ket vector |B〉, and 〈A|B〉 is also called a
‘bra-ket’, and it satisfies the following properties:
(i) 〈A|A〉 ≥ 0;
(ii) 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉∗, where 〈B|A〉∗ is the complex conjugate of 〈A|B〉;
(iii) 〈A|(z|B〉 + t|C〉) = z〈A|B〉 + t〈A|C〉, for z, t ∈ C, where the sum vector z|B〉 + t|C〉 is called a
‘superposition’ of vectors |B〉 and |C〉 in the quantum jargon.
From (ii) and (iii) follows that inner product 〈·|·〉 is linear in the ket and anti-linear in the bra, i.e.
(z〈A|+ t〈B|)|C〉 = z∗〈A|C〉+ t∗〈B|C〉.
We recall that the ‘absolute value’ of a complex number is defined as the square root of the product of
this complex number times its complex conjugate, that is, |z| = √z∗z. Moreover, a complex number z can
either be decomposed into its cartesian form z = x+iy, or into its polar form z = |z|eiθ = |z|(cos θ+i sin θ).
As a consequence, we have |〈A|B〉| = √〈A|B〉〈B|A〉. We define the ‘length’ of a ket (bra) vector |A〉 (〈A|)
as |||A〉|| = ||〈A||| = √〈A|A〉. A vector of unitary length is called a ‘unit vector’. We say that the ket
vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are ‘orthogonal’ and write |A〉 ⊥ |B〉 if 〈A|B〉 = 0.
We have now introduced the necessary mathematics to state the first modeling rule of quantum theory,
as follows.
First quantum modeling rule: A state A of an entity – in our case a conceptual entity – modeled by quantum
theory is represented by a ket vector |A〉 with length 1, that is 〈A|A〉 = 1.
An orthogonal projection M is a linear operator on the Hilbert space, that is, a mapping M : H →
15
H, |A〉 7→ M |A〉 which is self-adjoint and idempotent. The latter means that, for every |A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and
z, t ∈ C, we have:
(i) M(z|A〉 + t|B〉) = zM |A〉 + tM |B〉 (linearity);
(ii) 〈A|M |B〉 = 〈B|M |A〉∗ (hermiticity);
(iii) M ·M =M (idempotency).
The identity operator 1 maps each vector onto itself and is a trivial orthogonal projection. We say
that two orthogonal projections Mk and Ml are orthogonal operators if each vector contained in the range
Mk(H) is orthogonal to each vector contained in the range Ml(H), and we write Mk ⊥ Ml, in this case.
The orthogonality of the projection operators Mk and Ml can also be expressed by MkMl = 0, where 0 is
the null operator. A set of orthogonal projection operators {Mk |k = 1, . . . , n} is called a ‘spectral family’
if all projectors are mutually orthogonal, that is, Mk ⊥ Ml for k 6= l, and their sum is the identity, that
is,
∑n
k=1Mk = 1. A spectral family {Mk |k = 1, . . . , n} identifies a self-adjoint operator O =
∑n
i=1 okMk,
where ok is called ‘eigenvalue of O’, i.e. is a solution of the equation O|o〉 = ok|o〉 – the non-null vectors
satisfying this equation are called ‘eigenvectors of O’.
The above definitions give us the necessary mathematics to state the second modeling rule of quantum
theory, as follows.
Second quantum modeling rule: A measurable quantity Q of an entity – in our case a conceptual entity
– modeled by quantum theory, and having a set of possible real values {q1, . . . , qn} is represented by a
spectral family {Mk |k = 1, . . . , n}, equivalently, by the self-adjoint operator Q =
∑n
k=1 qkMk, in the
following way. If the conceptual entity is in a state represented by the vector |A〉, then the probability of
obtaining the value qk in a measurement of the measurable quantity Q is 〈A|Mk|A〉 = ||Mk|A〉||2. This
formula is called the ‘Born rule’ in the quantum jargon. Moreover, if the value qk is actually obtained in
the measurement, then the initial state is changed into a state represented by the vector
|Ak〉 = Mk|A〉||Mk|A〉|| (74)
This change of state is called ‘collapse’ in the quantum jargon.
We denote by L (H ) the set of all orthogonal projection operators over the Hilbert space H . L (H ) has
the algebraic properties of a complete orthocomplemented lattice, but it is not distributive, hence L (H )
is not a σ-algebra. A ‘generalized probability measure’ over L (H ) is a function p : M ∈ L (H ) 7−→
p(M) ∈ [0, 1], such that p(1) = 1, and p(∑∞k=1Mk) = ∑∞k=1 p(Mk), for any countable sequence {Mk ∈
L (H )}k=1,2,... of mutually orthogonal projection operators.
Let us now suppose that the dimension of the Hilbert space is greater than 2. Then, the Born rule
establishes a connection between states and generalized probability measures, as follows. Given a state of a
conceptual entity represented by the unit vector |A〉 ∈ H , it is possible to bijectively associate |A〉 with a
generalized probability measure pA over L (H ), such that, for everyM ∈ L (H ), pA(M) = 〈A|M |A〉. This
is the content of the so-called ‘Gleason theorem’. The generalized probability measure pA is a ‘quantum
probability measure’ over L (H ). It should be noticed that the Gleason theorem admits a more general
formulation. However, the presentation here is sufficient for our purposes.
The tensor product HA ⊗HB of two Hilbert spaces HA and HB is the Hilbert space generated by the set
{|Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉}, where |Ai〉 and |Bj〉 are vectors of HA and HB, respectively, which means that a general
vector of this tensor product is of the form
∑
ij |Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉. This gives us the necessary mathematics to
introduce the third modeling rule.
Third quantum modeling rule: A state C of a compound entity – in our case a combination of conceptual
entities – is represented by a unit vector |C〉 of the tensor product HA ⊗HB of the two Hilbert spaces HA
and HB containing the vectors that represent the states of the component entities – concepts.
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The above means that we have |C〉 = ∑ij cij |Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉, where |Ai〉 and |Bj〉 are unit vectors of HA and
HB, respectively, and
∑
i,j |cij |2 = 1. We say that the state C represented by |C〉 is a product state if it is
of the form |A〉 ⊗ |B〉 for some |A〉 ∈ HA and |B〉 ∈ HB. Otherwise, C is called an ‘entangled state’.
The Fock space is a specific type of Hilbert space, originally introduced in quantum field theory. For
most states of a quantum field the number of identical quantum entities is not conserved but is a variable
quantity. The Fock space copes with this situation in allowing its vectors to be superpositions of vectors
pertaining to different sectors for fixed numbers of identical quantum entities. More explicitly, the k-th
sector of a Fock space describes a fixed number of k identical quantum entities, and it is of the form
H ⊗ . . . ⊗ H of the tensor product of k identical Hilbert spaces H. The Fock space F itself is the direct
sum of all these sectors, hence
F = ⊕jk=1 ⊗kl=1 H (75)
For our modeling we have only used Fock space for the ‘two’ and ‘one quantum entity’ case, hence F =
H ⊕ (H ⊗ H). This is due to considering only combinations of two concepts. The sector H is called
the ‘sector 1’, while the sector H ⊗ H is called the ‘sector 2’. A unit vector |F 〉 ∈ F is then written as
|F 〉 = neiγ |C〉+meiδ(|A〉 ⊗ |B〉), where |A〉, |B〉 and |C〉 are unit vectors of H, and such that n2+m2 = 1.
For combinations of j concepts, the general form of Fock space expressed in Equation (75) will have to be
used.
This quantum-theoretic modeling can be generalized by allowing states to be represented by the so
called ‘density operators’ and measurements to be represented by the so called ‘positive operator valued
measures’. However, our representation above is sufficient for attaining the results in this paper.
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